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Carter and Burton: The Criminal Element of Neutrality Agreements

THE CRIMINAL ELEMENT OF NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENTS
Mark A. Carter*& Shawn P. Burton**

I.

THE RISE OF THE NEUTRALITY AGREEMENT

Over twenty years ago, Harvard Law Professor Paul Weiler
boldly proclaimed that "[c]ontemporary American labor law more
and more resembles an elegant tombstone for a dying institution." 1
Weiler's words were somewhat prophetic, as today the Boardsupervised election is all but dying. 2 General Counsel Meisburg's 2006
Operations Report is proof enough of this fact. 3 According to the
Report, only 3643 representation petitions were received during the
2006 fiscal year, compared to 4894 in the previous fiscal year.4 This5
amounted to an unspeakable 25.6% decline in just one fiscal year.
The downward trend continued in 2007.6 Although dramatic, the
* Mark A. Carter is a partner in the Charleston, West Virginia office of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
He is a Fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, a past officer of the Antitrust,
RICO and Labor Law Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Labor and
Employment Law, and a Contributing Editor to The DevelopingLabor Law.
** Shawn P. Burton is an in-house attorney where he practices labor and employment law. Burton
isa graduate of the University of Toledo College of Law, where he was Editor In Chief of the
Toledo Law Review and graduated Order of the Coif. He has co-taught traditional labor law at
the Chase College of Law, and recently co-authored Oakwood Healthcare,Inc. 348 N.L.R.B. No.
137 (2006). How Textualism Saved The Supervisory Exemption, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1
(2006). The views expressed by Mr. Burton herein are his personal views.
1. Paul Weiler, Promise to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983).
2. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Death Of Labor Law?, 2 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 105 (2006)
("Labor law is clearly ailing....").
3. See RONALD MEISBURG, OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNS., NLRB, MEMORANDUM GC 07-03
(2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov (search "All of NLRB.gov" for "GC 07-03" then follow
"GC 07-03" hyperlink).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See RONALD MEISBURG, OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNs., NLRB, MEMORANDUM GC 08-01
(2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov (search "All of NLRB.gov" for "GC 08-01" then follow
"GC 08-01" hyperlink).
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numbers in the last ten years are even more staggering.7 Since 1997,
the number of representation petitions filed with the Board has
decreased by 41%, from 6179 in 1997 to 3643 in 2006.
The reason behind this dramatic decrease is no mystery. Unions
view the traditional statutory recognition model as incapable of
providing the "laboratory conditions" 9 it once promised. 10 From the
unions' perspective, the delay, lack of meaningful access to the
electorate, and ineffectual remedies for unfair labor practices make
the Board-supervised election a truly unequal playing field." As one
recent scholar put it, "optimism has given way to cynicism and
despair about the law's ability to protect workers and enhance
collective bargaining." 12 Some estimate, for example, that the Board
takes an average of 557 days to certify a union after an election
accompanied by illegal conduct. 13 Former General Counsel Feinstein
similarly estimated that it takes roughly two years to prosecute an
unfair labor practice case. 14 Also, consider the fact that employers
are permitted to freely distribute anti-union literature during work
time, hold compulsory captive audience speeches during working
hours, and conduct one-on-one meetings with employees.1 5 Unions,
on the other hand, do not generally enjoy the same access.
Employers may lawfully restrict the distribution of union literature by6
employees, as well as employee discussions about union organizing.'
7. NLRB: NLRB General Counsel Reports, Large Drop in Election Petitions, 181 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 28, 28 (Jan. 15, 2007).
8. Id.
9. Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) ("In election proceedings, it is the Board's
function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.").
10. Steven Greenhouse, Unions, Bruised in DirectBattles with Companies, Try a Roundabout
Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at B7 (quoting Andrew Stem, President of the Service
Employees International Union, as saying, "the system of representation elections is heavily
weighted in favor of employers.").
11. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospectsfor
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832-34. Unions are seeking to "[s]idestep the
intimidating consequences of employers' anti-union speech or conduct and to minimize the
eviscerating impact of lengthy delays under the Board's legal regime." Id. at 832.
12. Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act. What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?,
45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 126 (2003).
13. David J. Doorey, Neutrality Agreements: Bargainingfor Representation Rights in the
Shadow of the State, 13 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 7 n.23 (2006).
14. Fred Feinstein, The Challenge of Being General Counsel, 16 LAB. L. 9, 34 (2000)
(footnote omitted).
15. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958); NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
16. See Gissel PackingCo., 395 U.S. at 361.
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Employers may also lawfully prohibit non-employee union officials
from accessing its facilities altogether. 17
Whether you accept these arguments or not, the stark reality is
that the labor movement's strategy for halting the decline in union
membership has changed vastly in recent years.' 8 Unions are turning
more and more to non-traditional recognition models to gain new
members. 19 Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") Local
32BJ leader Mike Fishman bluntly stated recently that, "[w]e don't
do elections. 2 ° Consider, for instance, the movement's highlypublicized attempt to legislate-away its membership and election ills.
Since November of 2006, when the Democratic Party took control
of both houses of Congress, unions throughout the country have
focused their efforts and resources on passing the Employee Free
Choice Act. 2 1 AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney "called this the
labor movement's top priority .... ,22 The Union's efforts seem to
be paying off, because on March 1, 2007, the House of
Representatives passed the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) by a
vote of 241 to 185.23 The bill narrowly escaped passage after the
Democrats failed to get the sixty votes necessary to defeat the
17. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540-541. However, unionization success rates
may be unaffected by employer behavior. Perhaps the most well-known scholarly piece is the
often cited Stephen B. Goldberg, Julius G. Getman & Jeanne M. Brett, Union Representation
Elections: Law and Realty: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 MICH. L. REV. 564 (1981). In
that piece, the authors argue that employer anti-union campaigns have little, if any, impact on
election results. Id. at 569. Based on interviews with 1000 employees, the authors quite
convincingly demonstrate that "[flor the great majority of employees . . . the effect of the
campaign, if any, must be to cause them to vote consistent with their original intent." Id. In fact,
they found that statistically "eighty-seven percent voted in accordance with that intent, despite
vigorous, frequently unlawful campaigning in nearly every election." Id.
18. Editorial, Labor's New Organizing Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at A20
("American labor leaders are developing a new tactic to boost union membership.").
19. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 824-25 ("Starting in the late 1970s, individual employers
and unions began negotiating agreements that modified this traditional [NLRB-regulated]
").
approach ....
20. Timothy Aeppel, Not-So-Big Labor Enlists New Methods for Greater Leverage, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 29, 2005, at A2.
21. Organizing: LaborLeaders, Organizers Strategize Over How to Assure Passageof CardCheck Bill, 237 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at B-1 (Dec. 11, 2006). The EFCA imposes stiffer
penalties for the commission of unfair labor practices committed during union organizing drives.
Catherine Hollingsworth, Organizing: Card-Check Bill Introduced in House Would Allow Workers
to Bypass Elections, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-4 (Feb. 7, 2007). Furthermore, the EFCA,
arguably, eliminates secret ballot elections. See, e.g., id.
22. Michelle Amber, Organizing: AFL-CIO Affiliates Look at Ways to Expand the Labor
Movement, 238 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1 (Dec. 12, 2006).
23. Steven Greenhouse, House Passes Top Priorityof Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at
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Republican-led filibuster.
Another fundamental, non-traditional recognition model used by
unions, and one that has recently taken center stage with the Board
and the labor community, is the neutrality agreement. The neutrality
agreement has indeed grown in popularity over time. As one scholar
recently noted, "[b]y the late 1990s, as unions bargained for
neutrality protection with greater frequency, these agreements had
become a central component of the labor movement's organizing
strategy.,, 25 Moving into the twenty-first century, nothing has
changed. According to former Board member John Raudabaugh,
"more than 80 percent of [the AFL-CIO's] newly organized
employees in 2002 were organized through corporate campaigns and
,26 In fact,
bargained-for neutrality and card check agreements ...
from 1998 through 2003, the AFL-CIO reported that it organized
roughly three million workers, less than one-fifth of which "were
27
added through the formerly pre-eminent Board elections process."
have emerged as "the
Without a doubt, neutrality agreements
28
choice.,
of
instrument
organizing
Neutrality agreements are simply pre-election bargained for
agreements between organizing unions and the employers of
employees they seek to organize. 29 These agreements set forth the
"rules of the game," so to speak, for the organizing campaign. 30 The
type and number of rules agreed to vary widely. The first neutrality
agreement, for instance, believed to have been between the United
Auto Workers ("UAW") and General Motors Corporation ("GM") in
1976, was simple3l: it merely prohibited the employer from
disparaging or advocating against the union or unionism during the
24. See GOP Blocks Union Bill in Senate, USA TODAY, June 26, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-26-senate-unionsN.htm.
25. Brudney, supra note 11, at 825 (footnote omitted).
26. UnionFacts.com, Union Bosses Only Use Elections When It Suits Them,
www.unionfacts.com/articles/democracyElections.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2007) (quoting John
Raudabaugh of the NLRB).
27. Brudney, supra note 11, at 828.
28. Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369,
377 (2001).
29. See Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own
Obsolescence?, 16 LAB. L. 201, 201-03 (2000).
30. See id. at 203 ("Simply put, neutrality agreements go far beyond a company remaining
neutral in the face of a union organizing drive at one of its unorganized facilities.").
31. See Andrew M. Kramer, Lee E. Miller & Leonard Bierman, Neutrality Agreements: The
New Frontier in Labor Relations-FairPlay or Foul?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 39, 40 (1981) (explaining
this first neutrality agreement).
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election campaign. 32 In return, the33UAW agreed not to disparage
General Motors during the campaign.
These agreements evolved over time, however, becoming
increasingly sophisticated. Today, neutrality agreements commonly
contain employer gag rules (like the one in the original UAW/GM
agreement), mutual non-disparagement provisions, union access
clauses, card check clauses, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,
Some neutrality
and after-acquired stores/facility clauses. 34
agreements contain clauses giving unions access to a list of names,
addresses, telephone numbers, and job titles for all employees eligible
for representation long before the analogous Excelsior Underwear,
Inc.35 mandate is imposed.36 Others go as far as requiring employers
to hold compulsory captive audience speeches where union officials
37
speak on the benefits of their unions and unionization in general.
And still others set the substantive contract terms for future
collective bargaining agreements,38despite the Board's seemingly clear
prohibition against such conduct.
32. Id. at40n.6,41.
33. Id. at 40 n.6.
34. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card
Check Agreements, 55 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 42 (2001) (giving a thorough overview of the
types of provisions commonly included in neutrality agreements after examination of 118 separate
agreements); see also Brent Garren, The High Road to Section 7 Rights: The Law of Voluntary
Recognition Agreements, 54 LAB. L.J. 263, 264-65 (2003) (discussing the contents of modem
neutrality agreements).
35. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966); see discussion infra Part IV.A.
36. An agreement between Heartland Industrial Partners, LLP and the United Steelworkers
International Union contained the following provision: "The Company shall provide the Union
with a complete list of all of its employees in the proposed bargaining unit who are eligible for
union representation. Such a list shall include each employee's full name, home address, job title,
and work location." Appellants/Cross Appellees' Final First Brief at 9, Patterson v. Heartland
Indus. Partners, Nos. 06-3791 & 06-3792 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Patterson Brief] (on
file with authors).
37. See Tentative Agreement By and Between Freightliner LLC and UAW for the Purpose
of Establishing a Card Check Procedure at 1, Freightliner LLC-UAW, Dec. 16, 2002 [hereinafter
Tentative Agreement] ("Freightliner and the UAW will jointly present an initial information
program that explains the card check procedure to employees. In advance of the meeting, a letter
from Freightliner will be sent to all employees explaining the card check Agreement and process
that will be used-including the date and time of the meetings to be held in the Plant. Attendance
at these meetings will be compulsory, with pay, during working hours.") (on file with authors).
38. See, e.g., In re Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38, 39 (1949) (allowing employers and
non-certified unions to bargain over the substantive terms of a future collective bargaining
agreement as long as the parties did not formally execute their agreement until the union attained
representative status), overruled by Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 860 & n.3 (1964)
(prohibiting unions and employers from even negotiating substantive contract terms prior to the
union attaining representative status). Recently, the Administrative Law Judge in Dana Corp.,
2005 NLRB LEXIS 174 (A.L.J. Apr. 11, 2005), questioned whether the Majestic Weaving
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II. ATTACKING THE NEUTRALITY AGREEMENT

A. CongressionalAnd Agency Attacks
Neutrality agreements have come under increased attack in
recent years. A Canadian scholar examining U.S. labor law quite
accurately stated: "A battle is raging in American labour law" over
neutrality agreements. 39 In May 2002, several Republican members
of Congress introduced a House bill seeking to eliminate the unions'
and employers' right to enter into neutrality agreements containing
card check clauses. 40 A similar bill, entitled the Secret Ballot
Protection Act of 2004,41 was introduced two years later, also
designed to make certain neutrality agreements unlawful.4 2
The Board, similarly, has chipped away at neutrality clauses.
In June 2004, the NLRB, by a 3-2 vote, agreed to consider whether
and to what extent a recognition bar prevents employees from
petitioning for decertification after the union has gained
recognition pursuant to a voluntary recognition or a neutrality
agreement. 43 Not unexpectedly, the Board in the fall of 2007
limited the reach of the recognition bar in these situations.4 4 Now,
unlike with recognition achieved through a secret-ballot election, no
election bar will be imposed on decertification after a card-based
recognition unless two conditions are met. 45 First, employees in the
bargaining unit must receive notice of the recognition and of their
right, within forty-five days of the notice, to file a decertification
petition or to support the filing of a petition by a rival union.46
Second, forty-five days must pass from the date of notice without
the filing of a valid petition.
According to the Board, its decision
was driven "to provide greater protection for employees' statutory
right of free choice and to give proper effect to the court- and

doctrine
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

applies to neutrality agreements. Id. at * 17.
See Doorey, supra note 13, at 2.
Workers' Bill of Rights, H.R. 4636, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2002).
H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. (2004).
Id. at § 3(b).
Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1283 (2004) (order granting review).
See Dana Corp., 351 NLRB No. 28, 2007 WL 2891099, at *2 (Sept. 29, 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Board-recognized statutory preference for resolving questions
concerning representation through a Board secret-ballot election. '48
The after-acquired stores clause, a common neutrality agreement
feature that facilitates recognition without a secret-ballot election,
has also been challenged. 49 In March 2006, the Board, by a 2-1 vote,
Again, not
agreed to consider the propriety of such clauses. 50
unexpectedly, the Board in Supervalu, Inc.5 1 indirectly limited a
union's ability to achieve recognition through a non-traditional
method by making the after-acquired stores clause a non-mandatory
The implication is
subject of bargaining in most circumstances.
clear. Employers can resist inclusion of such clauses in a collective
bargaining agreement and, importantly, can pursue an unfair labor
practice charge against a union that insists on its inclusion, effectively
eliminating another tool used by unions to avoid the purported perils
of the traditional recognition model.53
B. JudicialAttacks
Neutrality agreements have also been attacked in the courts. In
2003, for instance, a group of employees from Heartland Industrial
Partners, LLP filed suit under section 302 of the Labor Management
Relations Act challenging a neutrality agreement entered into
between their employer, Heartland, and the United Steel, Paper and
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (USW). 54 This suit
neutrality agreements; therefore, it is
was a comprehensive attack on
55
worth briefly exploring here.
In 2000, Heartland and the USW agreed to, what they called, the
"Framework for a Constructive Collective Bargaining Relationship"
48. Id. at *5.
49. Susan J. McGolrick, NLRA: NLRB 2-1 Grants Shaw's Request for Review in Case
Involving After-Acquired Store Clause, 55 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-I (Mar. 22, 2006).
50. Id.
51. 351 NLRB No. 41,2007 WL 2948440 (Sept. 30, 2007).
52. Id. at *7.
53. See id.
54. Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, 428 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716, 718 & n.3 (N.D.
Ohio 2006).
55. The issue of neutrality agreements violating section 302 has been raised before. In
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir.
2004), the defendant argued that the neutrality agreement that it had entered into was void
because it violated section 302. Id. at 209-10. The Third Circuit found that the agreement did not
amount to a "thing of value" and, therefore, did not violate section 302. Id. at 219.
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Pursuant to the Framework
Agreement").56
("Framework
Agreement, Heartland agreed to provide the USW with organizing
assistance. 57 Specifically, it agreed to provide, among other things, a
list of names and addresses of all employees eligible for
representation, access to the workplace for purposes of campaigning,
and a guarantee that company officials would "refrain from speaking
The USW, in return, agreed to a
unfavorably about the union. 58
59
concessions.
bargaining
host of
Based on this quid pro quo arrangement, plaintiffs claimed that
the USW unlawfully demanded and accepted a "thing of value" and
6°
that Heartland unlawfully delivered a "thing of value" to the USW.
The
Both acts, the plaintiffs claimed, violated section 302.61
defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the
organizing assistance delivered to and accepted by the union did not
constitute a "thing of value." 62 The court agreed. Since no "money
changed hands," the court framed the question at issue in the
following terms: "[D]o neutrality or cooperative agreements given
between the parties constitute the kind of 'other thing of value' that
Answering in the negative, the court
the statute prohibits? ' 63
adopted wholesale the Third Circuit's reasoning in Hotel Employees
& RestaurantEmployees Union v. Sage HospitalityResources, LLC:
There are many reasons why this argument makes no sense,
including the language of [s]ection 302 itself, which proscribes
agreements to "pay, lend, or deliver .. any money or other thing of
value." The agreement here involves no payment, loan, or delivery of
anything. The fact that a Neutrality Agreement - like any other labor
arbitration agreement - benefits both parties with efficiency and cost
saving does not transform it into a payment or delivery of some
benefit. "Furthermore, any benefit to the union inherent in a more
does not constitute a thing
efficient resolution of recognition disputes 64
of value within the meaning of the statute."

56. Heartland,478 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
57. Id. at716-17.
58. Id. at717.
59. Id.
60. Complaint at 13-15, 17-19, Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, No. 5:03 CV
1596, 428 F. Supp. 2d 714 (N.D. Ohio July 3, 2003) (on file with authors).
61. Id. at 15, 18, 19.
62. Heartland,428 F. Supp. 2d at 716, 719.
63. Id. at 723-24.
64. Id. at 724 (quoting Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. Sage Hospitality Res.,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol25/iss1/7

8

2007]

Carter
and Burton:ELEMENT
The Criminal
Element of Neutrality
Agreements
THE CRIMINAL
OF NEUTRALITY
A GREEMENTS

181

There was, indeed, no further analysis by the court. The court
adhered to the Third Circuit's logic in Sage Hospitality, without
further analysis of the institutional realities or needs of unions. 65 The
plaintiffs in Heartland have appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.66
The most recent judicial attack on neutrality agreements came
from an unlikely source using an unlikely statutory scheme. In
January 2006, a group of employees from Freightliner LLC filed suit
advancing a novel legal theory under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") and section 302.67 In Adcock v.
Freightliner LLC, the plaintiffs claimed that the neutrality
agreements between their employer and the union seeking
recognition ran afoul of RICO.6 8 The claim was premised on an
allegedly unlawful scheme wherein an employer delivers valuable
organizing assistance to a union in exchange for the union's
agreement to make future bargaining concessions. 69 The employees,
represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation, did not enjoy success. As in Heartland, the court in
Freightliner dismissed their claims because the organizing assistance
that was the foundation of their case did not constitute, from the
70
court's perspective, a "thing of value.,
The remainder of this paper explores the contours of this most
recent attack on neutrality agreements. In Part III.A, the paper
outlines the nuts and bolts of RICO claims premised on section 302.
In Part III.B, the Freightlinercase is examined in detail. Then in
Part IV, the paper presents the authors' thoughts on whether the
decision in Freightliner sounded the death knell for section 302
premised RICO claims and concludes that certain neutrality
agreements likely violate RICO and are, therefore, criminal. In the
last Part, the authors explore the potential implications of making
neutrality agreements unlawful under RICO.

LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004)).
65. Id.
66. Patterson Brief, supranote 36.
67. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *1-2
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000); Labor Management Relations
Act § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) (2000).
68. Freightliner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *1-2.
69. Complaint-Class Action at 1, Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32-K, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82279 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Adcock Complaint] (on file with
authors).
70. Freighdiner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4-5.
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III. RICO

ACTIONS PREMISED ON SECTION
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

302 OF THE
("LMRA")

LABOR

A. Nuts and Bolts of Section 302 PremisedRICO Claims
RICO makes it unlawful for "any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity . . . to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise . . . ."" RICO
also makes it unlawful "to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
,,7
In either instance,
activity ...
pattern of racketeering
there are four basic elements to any RICO claim. To hold an
employer liable under RICO, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) a
person (2) through a pattern of racketeering activity (3) acquired or
maintained, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of (4)
73
To hold a
any enterprise which is engaged in interstate commerce.
union liable under RICO, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove:
(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity. 74 As a threshold matter, RICO requires that
litigants first establish the pattern of predicate activity (i.e.
The RICO statute lists a number of
racketeering activity). 75
76
A
section
302
violation is an enumerated predicate
predicate acts.
act.
Section 302 provides that it

shall be unlawful for any employer .

. to pay, lend, or deliver, or
agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value.., to
any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which
represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of
.

71. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2000).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
73. Freightliner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)).
74. Freightiner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *3 (citation omitted).
75. Cent. Distribs. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn., 5 F.3d 181, 183-84 (6th Cir. 1993). "In order to
maintain a civil RICO action, a [p]laintiff must first demonstrate that the [d]efendant had
committed one of the crimes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and prove each prong of this
predicate criminal offense." Synergy Fin., LLC v. Zarro, 329 F. Supp. 2d 701, 712 (W.D.N.C.
2004) (citing Cent. Distribs. ofBeer, 5 F.3d at 183-184).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I) (Supp. 2006).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(c).
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the employees of such employer ....78
Section 302 imposes a similar restriction on unions, making it
unlawful to demand, accept, or receive "any money or other thing of
value." 79 Accordingly, an employer violates RICO if it acquires or
maintains control of a union, or conducts the affairs of a union,
through a "pattern" of section 302 violations. 8° Similarly, a union
violates RICO if it conducts or participates in the affairs of an
employer through a "pattern" of section 302 violations. 81
B. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC
There is not much history to section 302 premised RICO claims,
at least not where the predicate act is the delivery and acceptance of
organizing assistance. To date, only one lawsuit has been filed. This
lawsuit was filed as a class action by five employees of Freightliner
LLC in January 2006.82 The lawsuit challenged the lawfulness of a
neutrality agreement entered into by Freightliner and the UAW. 83
The case was ultimately dismissed by the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina and is currently on appeal
in the Fourth Circuit. 84 The relevant facts alleged are set forth
below.
Freightliner is a manufacturer with multiple facilities in the
United States. 85 The case mainly involved four facilities, all of which
were located in North Carolina: Mt. Holly Truck Manufacturing
Plant; Gastonia Parts Manufacturing Plant; Cleveland Truck
Manufacturing Plant; and Thomas Built Buses Manufacturing Plant. 86
Only the Mt. Holly facility was unionized.87
The Mt. Holly
employees were represented by the UAW. 88
The plaintiffs alleged that during the early spring of 2002, the
UAW initiated an effort to organize the other Freightliner
78. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) (2000).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1).
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(C), 1962(b)-(c) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
81. Id.
82. Adcock Complaint, supra note 69, at 1.
83. Id. at 1-2.
84. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *5
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006), appealdocketed, No. 06-2287 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2006).
85. Adcock Complaint, supra note 69, 5.
86. Id. 22, 30, 36, 45, 58.
87. Id. 15.
88. Id.
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facilities. 89 In doing so, a UAW official contacted Freightliner and
Among its
demanded assistance in its organizational efforts. 90
demands were compulsory captive audience meetings with
Freightliner and UAW officials, access to the various Freightliner
facilities for the purpose of soliciting support, and prohibitions
against negative comments about the UAW and unionization. 91
In response to these demands, Freightliner insisted that the
UAW agree to certain preconditions in exchange for any organizing
assistance. 92 Chief among these preconditions was an agreement that
the UAW make bargaining concessions at the expense of employees
that the UAW represented at the Mt. Holly facility and at the
expense of employees that the UAW was seeking to represent at the
Freightliner made this
other three North Carolina facilities. 93
precondition clear to the UAW in an August 2002 letter, insisting
that:
A final agreement is dependent upon receiving some contractual
relief at Mt. Holly. Specifically, Freightliner expects cancellation of
12/02-wage increase, cancellation of 1/03 profit sharing bonus, benefits
and an extension of the current contract
cost sharing by employees,
94
increases.
wage
no
with
After both parties fired off their first demands, negotiations
began and continued into the winter of 2002. 95 Finally, in December
2002, Freightliner and the UAW entered into two interrelated
agreements. 96 One was entitled the "Tentative Agreement By and
Between Freightliner LLC and UAW for the Purpose of Establishing
a Card Check Procedure" ("Card Check Agreement"). 97 In the Card
Check Agreement, Freightliner agreed to compulsory captive
audience meetings, access to its facilities, and a gag rule. 98 The other
agreement was entitled the "Agreement on Preconditions to a Card
Check Procedure Between Freightliner LLC and the UAW"

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. 16.
Id.
Id. 17.
Id.
Id. 19.
See id 1118-20.
Id. $ 20.
Tentative Agreement, supra note 37, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
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("Preconditions Agreement").9 9 It identified a long list of bargaining
concessions agreed to by the UAW with respect to wages, benefits,
and other terms and conditions such as transfer rights, subcontracting
rights, and overtime. 100
Several aggrieved employees filed a thirty-nine page, 113
paragraph, four count complaint in January 2006.101 Freightliner and
the UAW were the two named defendants. 102 Both defendants filed a
motion to dismiss.10 3 The defendants argument was essentially twofold. First, they claimed that plaintiffs failed to establish a violation
0 4
of section 302 (i.e. the threshold predicate act requirement).'
Second, they claimed that, even if plaintiffs had made the requisite
threshold showing, they failed to establish a "pattern" of section 302
violations. 105
On November 9, 2006, the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina issued a brief opinion, with sparse
analysis, dismissing the lawsuit. 0 6 According to Judge Mullen, there
was "no evidence that 'things of value' were improperly exchanged
between the UAW and Freightliner."' 0 7 Relying on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Hotel Employees v. Marriott Corp.'0 8 and the
Third Circuit's decision in Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
Union v. Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC,' 0 9 Judge Mullen reasoned
that "[p]articipation of unions and employers in card check programs
is proper and has never [been] held to be illegal.""10 From a public
99. Agreement on Preconditions to a Card Check Procedure Between Freightiner LLC and
the UAW at 1, Freightliner LLC-UAW, Dec. 16, 2003 [hereinafter Preconditions Agreement] (on
file with authors).
100. Id. at 1-2.
101. Adcock Complaint, supra note 69, at 1.
102. Id.
103. Brief in Support of Defendant UAW's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Adcock v. Freightliner
LLC, No. 3:06CV32-MU, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter
UAW Motion to Dismiss] (on file with authors); Memorandum of Law of Defendant Freightliner
LLC in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32-MU
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Freightliner Motion to Dismiss] (on file with authors).
104. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 2; Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supra note
103, at 2.
105. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 2-3; Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 103, at 6.
106. See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *1-5
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006).
107. Freightliner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4.
108. 961 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1992).
109. 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004).
110. Freightiner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4-5 (citing Hotel Employees v. Marriott
Corp., 961 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1992); Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. Sage
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policy perspective, Judge Mullen further reasoned that "[i]f the
[c]ourt were to find that participation in cardcheck agreements was
illegal, it would have the effect of criminalizing all collective
bargaining agreements."' 11
The court did not reach the issue of
whether the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a "pattern" of section 302
violations. 1 2
Similar to Heartland, the plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal, and the case is currently pending before the Fourth
Circuit. 113
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 302 PREMISED RICO CLAIMS

The foregoing discussion begs the question of what the future
holds for RICO claims premised on section 302 of the LMRA? As
the courts in Sage Hospitality, Heartland, and Freightliner made
clear, this largely depends on whether litigants can demonstrate that
there was a demand for and delivery of a "thing of value."' " 4 With
neutrality agreements, the union does not demand nor does the
employer deliver "money."
The crucial question is, therefore,
whether organizing assistance falls within the statutory phrase "other
things of value." The courts in Heartland, Sage Hospitality, and,
most recently, Freightlinerall said no to this question. 1 5 But these
courts by no6 means settled the issue because Freightlineris currently
on appeal. 1
As the remainder of this paper demonstrates, there is a
possibility that the Freightlinercourt will be reversed on appeal. The
authors argue that there is a basis upon which the courts could
conclude that "organizing assistance" constitutes a "thing of value."
The reason the district courts in Heartlandand Freightlinerdid not
reach this same conclusion was because they failed to realistically
examine the "value" of the organizing assistance in question. If the
Fourth Circuit does that which other courts have thus far failed to do

Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004)).
111. Id. at *5.
112. See generally id. (granting defendants' motion to dismiss without addressing "pattern").
113. Id., appealdocketed, No. 06-2287 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2006).
114. Sage Hospitality, 390 F.3d at 218; Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, 428 F.
Supp. 2d 714, 723-24 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Freightliner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4.
115. Sage Hospitality, 390 F.3d at219; Heartland, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 724; Freightliner, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4.
116. Freightliner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, appeal docketed, No. 06-2287 (4th Cir. Dec.
8, 2006). The Heartland case was voluntarily dismissed as moot about a week before oral
argument in the Sixth Circuit in September 2007.
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and critically scrutinizes the organizing assistance bargained for as
real, tangible, and economically valuable, it should conclude that
organizing assistance, particularly active (versus passive) organizing
assistance, is a "thing of value."
The future of these claims also largely depends on the litigants
establishing a "pattern" of section 302 violations. No court has
addressed this issue in the organizing assistance context.
The
plaintiffs in Freightliner raised the argument, but the court never
reached the issue because it dismissed the case for failure to satisfy the
threshold predicate act requirement.117 The authors explore below
the contours of the "pattern" requirement and argue that plaintiffs
may similarly be able to successfully meet this requirement.
A. OrganizingAssistance Can Constitute a "Thing of Value"
As explained in Part III.A above, to prevail on a section 302
claim, the plaintiff must show that the union demanded, or the
employer delivered, a "thing of value." The employer in Freightliner
argued that organizing assistance does not amount to a thing of value
because section 302 only covers "tangible" things that are "financial
in nature." 18
According to the employer, "[o]nly rarely has
[s]ection 302 been applied to the payment or delivery of non-cash
items, and in those few cases, the 'value' conferred was of some
financial benefit, not some ephemeral, subjective value." 119 The
employer argued in the alternative that since neutrality agreements
generally have been found lawful, the neutrality agreements at issue
had to be lawful under section 302.120 The union advanced a similar
argument, asserting that "[n]eutrality
agreements like the
Freightliner-UAW Agreement at issue here have consistently been
held to be lawful and enforceable under the National Labor Relations
Act." 121 Both arguments are vulnerable for the reasons that follow.
The first argument is based on a premise that evades the nature
and financial needs of unions. It can be said that unions are not
purely altruistic institutions, making decisions without a care for what

117. Freightliner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *5; Adcock Complaint, supra note 69,
91-92, 103-04, 111-12.
118. Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supranote 103, at 6-8.
119. Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 935-36 (3d. Cir. 1982); United States
v. Schiffman, 552 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1977)).
120. Id. at 11-12; UAW Motion to Dismiss, supranote 103, at 12-13 (citations omitted).
121. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 6 (citations omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

15

188
Hofstra

HOFSTRA
LABOR &Law
EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL
Labor
and Employment
Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2007],[Vol.
Art. 725:173

they receive in return for their organizing efforts. Arguably, unions
are no different than any other American business that operates
under the weight of a balance sheet. Therefore, in order to survive, a
union must balance debit and credit. They face the same economic
reality facing any business, even a non-profit business. As any other
business, they care, and in fact, must care, about money. There is, of
course, nothing wrong with valuing money. How else would unions
achieve their legitimate goals?
The point is not to challenge or question the motives of the
union movement, but rather merely to argue that organizing
assistance provides no "tangible" benefit or is "financial in nature."
It is reasonable to assume that the heart of the union movement is its
members, because members contribute financially via membership
dues. In this respect, members are, without a doubt, the gold standard.
More members equals more union dues, and union dues fuel the ability
to organize more members. Unions, therefore, logically want union
dues to sustain the movement. And anything that makes it easier for
unions to meet this need is something of value.
There can be little doubt that organizing assistance helps meet
this need, because such assistance may significantly increase unions'
chances of achieving representative status.
There is an
uncontroverted body of scholarly literature, for instance, confirming
a "correlation between employer campaigning and the probability
that the employees will vote against collective bargaining."'' 2 2 One
scholar even suggested that the growing resistance exerted by
management during organizing drives "may be a major factor in the
more rapid decline of U.S. unions.' 2 3 Neutrality agreements, which
122. Doorey, supranote 13, at 10. See generally Weiler, supranote 1,at 1776-86 (discussing
varying employer intimidation tactics and the probability that these tactics caused the decrease in
union victory rates from 1950 to 1980); William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaignson
CertificationElections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 574 (1983)
(conducting a statistical examination of 3100 elections and asserting, among other things, that
"written communications distributed late in the campaign and meetings held early in the campaign
most probably have an effect [on how workers vote in union elections]."). The union victory rate
has dropped precipitously since the 1950s where it hovered around seventy percent. Weiler,
supra note 1,at 1776 tbl.1. Since the 1960s, the union victory rate has been around fifty percent.
Doorey, supra note 13, at 3 n.7.
123. Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understandingthe Decline of
Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 519-20 (2001) ("Management resistance
to unionization has long been considered a deterrent to the growth of private sector unions.")
(citation omitted); see also Dickens, supra note 122, at 574 ("[B]oth legal and illegal tactics can
affect how workers vote."); Hartley, supra note 28, at 372 (including employer intimidation as one
of four disadvantages "widely understood as contributing significantly to the decline in union
membership during the last quarter of the twentieth century").
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largely silence employers during an organizing campaign, eliminate
this "major factor."1 24 There is also a proven correlation between
election success and other forms of organizing assistance besides
simple neutrality, such as card check arrangements. One recent wellknown study conducted by Eaton and Kriesky found that when unions
were able to obtain neutrality agreements with card check
agreements, the election success rate was 78.2%, compared to the
overall NLRB election win rate of approximately 46%.125 Also,
consider the organizational benefits of having employee contact
information and equal union access to the workplace. Forty years
ago, the Board in Excelsior Underwear Inc. 126 went great lengths to
explain these benefits. 127 Thus, because increased union membership
equals increased financial profitability (a vital element of sustaining
the union movement) and union membership is ultimately increased
by employer organizing assistance, a claim that such assistance does
not constitute a tangible financial benefit to unions must be suspect.
Why else would unions make neutrality agreements the centerpiece
of their organizational strategy? If such agreements were not a
"thing of value" to unions, surely American labor leaders would not
from a
be making, as they are, "a fundamental shift in strategy away
' 28
60-year tradition of concentrating on workplace elections."'
The second argument, which the Freightliner court accepted,
misses the mark as well by framing the legal question in a way that
leads invariably to the desired answer. In other words, the employer
and the union both claim that the plaintiffs are attacking neutrality
agreements as a concept.129 By doing so, the defendants are focusing
the debate on "neutrality" and "card check" or passive employer
124. See Hartley, supra note 28, at 372 ("[N]eutrality agreements can redress four
disadvantages unions confront when organizing: employer intimidation, harmful delay, inadequate
access to employees, and inability to secure a first contract.").
125. Eaton & Kriesky, supranote 34, at 51-52.
126. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
127. Id. at 1240-43. The Board explained the organizing benefits in the following terms:
[T]hrough his possession of employee names and home addresses as well as his
ability to comunicate with employees on plant premises, [he] is assured of the
continuing opportunity to inform the entire electorate of his views with respect to union
representation. On the other hand, without a list of employee names and addresses, a
labor organization, whose organizers normally have no right of access to plant
premises, has no method by which it can be certain of reaching all the employees with
its arguments in favor of representation ....
Id. at 1240-41 (footnote omitted).
128. Greenhouse, supranote 10, at B7.
129. See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4-5
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006).
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assistance (i.e. remaining silent during the campaign and accepting
authorization cards as a means of determining representative status),
rather than the individual provisions contained within the agreements
that provide purely active assistance. Indeed, both defendants, as well
as the courts in Freightliner and Sage Hospitality, uncritically find
that neutrality agreements are ideal and lawful under section 302.130
As the court in Freightlinerexplained, "[p]articipation of unions and
employers in 1card
check programs is proper and has never [been] held
31
to be illegal."'
This analysis focuses entirely on clearly passive employer
conduct and ignores other forms of employer conduct in union
organizing drives. From a practical standpoint, it would seem that
there are three distinct forms of employer conduct that may be
exhibited during an organizing drive. One form is outright employer
resistance. This form of conduct is the most common, and the form
unions try to avoid with the use of neutrality agreements. The
second form of employer conduct is passive campaign assistance.
This form of conduct, which has become increasingly more popular,
is merely acquiescence. For example, employers agree to remain
silent during a campaign or not insist on a Board-supervised election.
Employers are simply inactive during and non-resistant to union
organizing efforts. The third form of employer organizing conduct is
active campaign assistance. This form is much more rare, but not
entirely uncommon as evidenced by Freightlinerand Heartland.
For obvious reasons, the first form of employer campaign
conduct, employer resistance, does not implicate section 302 (nor
RICO) because there is nothing of value involved. The second form
of employer campaign conduct, passiveness or acquiescence, also
does not implicate section 302, albeit for a less obvious reason.
Passive employer conduct, while certainly a "thing of value" to
unions, may not, arguably, be "lent" or "delivered" as required by
section 302. Pure employer neutrality and card check arrangements
are, therefore, more likely than not lawful under section 302. On the
other hand, active employer organizing assistance, such as granting
organizers access to the workforce during working hours and
compelling employees to attend union proselytizing meetings during
working hours, besides being a "thing of value," can be, and is, lent or

130. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206,
219 (3d Cir. 2004); Freightliner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4-5.
131. Freightiner,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *4.
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1 32 The line
delivered to the union, as was alleged in Freightliner.
between lawful and unlawful is not hard to see. Passive employer
conduct does not appear to be unlawful, because the employer is

essentially doing nothing. Active employer assistance, on the other

hand, appears unlawful, because the employer is actively doing
something for a union. The distinction is akin to the difference
between misfeasance and nonfeasance, with misfeasance being to
torts what active employer assistance is to section 302. There is
indeed (or at least should be) a relevant difference in the section 302
analysis between assistance and acquiescence, or action and
inaction. 133

Therefore, contrary to the UAW's argument in Freightliner,
section 302 would not render all neutrality agreements illegal. 34 A
neutrality agreement, like the original 1976 GM/UAW agreement,
which only contained a gag order, is most likely lawful under section
302 because it merely obligates the employer to "passive"
assistance. 135 But neutrality agreements that provide unions with
active organizing assistance, a significant asset in increasing
organizational success, may be unlawful because such assistance is
both delivered and a thing of value to unions. Clearly then, when the
focus is placed on the individual provisions contained within
neutrality agreements (rather than neutrality agreements as a
concept) and an honest examination of the union movement's
institutional needs is conducted, it is rational to conclude that active
organizing assistance can violate section 302.
B. A "Pattern" of Section 302 Violations Can Be Shown

If the threshold predicate act requirement is met, the litigant still
must be able to allege a "pattern" of section 302 violations,

132. Adcock Complaint, supra note 69, 72.
133. The Union will argue, of course, that this active versus passive distinction is
irreconcilable with the rule from Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), clinging to the obvious, but
intellectually lazy, contention that the Excelsior list is "delivered" to the union. This argument
misses the mark. The Excelsior list is an obligatory prerequisite to a free and fair election.
Employers are indeed forced to divulge this list. Id. at 1239-40. Even more basic than that, the
list is delivered to the Board, not the Union. Id. This simple procedural requirement necessarily
prevents the Excelsiorrule from running afoul of section 302.
134. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 11.
135. Hartley, supra note 28, at 377-78. Many of the early neutrality agreements were likely
lawful under section 302 because they focused almost exclusively on gagging the employer. See
id. at 378.
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otherwise, a RICO action cannot be maintained.1 36 The Supreme
Court's decision in H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.137 is
the seminal case on the "pattern" requirement. According to the high
Court, to meet the pattern requirement, there must be "continuity"
between the alleged predicate acts. 138 There are two forms of
continuity, open and closed. 139 To show the latter, there must be a
"series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of
time."' 14
But "[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or
months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this
requirement."' 41 With open continuity, the predicate act must pose
"a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future"
142
with no natural ending point.
In Freightliner,the union and the employer argued that open
continuity was not implicated because the scheme had a natural
1 43
ending point-recognition at the various Freightliner facilities.
The union and the employer further argued that closed continuity
could not be met either because the acts did not extend over a
"substantial period of time." 144 The employer claimed that the
scheme only lasted fifteen months. 145 Similarly, the union asserted
that the scheme lasted only fourteen months. 146 The plaintiffs
1 47
disputed this, claiming that the scheme lasted thirty-one months.
The court failed to address either open or closed continuity, 48 raising
the question: what constitutes a "pattern" of section 302 violations
premised on organizing assistance?

136. Mesasco, Inc. v. Wassermann, 886 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that a pattern
is a necessary "element of any RICO action").
137. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
138. Id. at 239.
139. Id.at 241.
140. Id.at 242.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 2-3, 25 (citing GE Inv. Private Placement
Partners 11v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2001)); Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supra note
103, at 18.
144. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 21, 24 (quoting H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989)); Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 18 (citing GE
Inv., 247 F.3d at 549).
145. Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 19.
146. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supranote 103, at 24.
147. See Adcock Complaint, supranote 69, at 7, 21.
148. See generally Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82279, at *4-5 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss without
addressing "pattern").
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1. Showing Open Continuity
The defendants in Freightliner were likely accurate in their
analysis of open-ended continuity. There appeared to be a natural
ending period, that being when the employees at the three
unorganized North Carolina facilities either accepted or rejected the
UAW. Logically after that, the employer would not be obligated to
provide the union with any organizing assistance. This would be true
of most neutrality agreements because of the natural ending pointthe date the election results are certified by the Board or the date the
authorization cards are counted. 149 However, there is one exception.
Where the neutrality agreement contains an after-acquired
stores/recognition clause, the employer's obligations to continue to
provide active assistance continues. 150 With these clauses, employers
agree to extend the parties' future collective bargaining agreement to
any "new unit if the union can establish majority support in that
unit."15 1 The inclusion of such a clause would, therefore, (in addition
to being potentially unlawful under Majestic Weaving Co.) 152 make
the scheme theoretically endless, allowing a plaintiff to show openended continuity.' 53 This is supported by existing caselaw. Courts
have held that "[p]redicate acts over a short period may nonetheless
meet the pattern requirement under an open-ended theory of
continuity" when there is a threat of continuity. 154 In Teamsters
Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers,155 the court explained that "[a]n
analysis of the threat of continuity cannot be made solely from
hindsight" because, "[a]ll racketeering activity must necessarily come
,,156
The D.C. Circuit reached a similar
to an end sometime.

149. Cf GE Inv., 247 F.3d at 549 ("Where the fraudulent conduct is part of the sale of a
single enterprise, the fraud has a built-in ending point, and the case does not present the necessary
threat of long-term, continued criminal activity.").
150. See Doorey, supra note 13, at 17 (explaining that an after acquired clause can extend a
collective agreement to a newly established unit not originally included in the agreement).
151. Id.
152. Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 860-61 (1964) (holding a contract invalid and
a violation of employees rights because the employer negotiated the contract terms with a nonmajority union).
153. This assumes that the employer provides active organizing assistance to the union in its
efforts to organize any facility acquired by the employer in the future. Otherwise, the predicate
act requirement could not be met.
154. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2525 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter 2 DEVELOPING] (footnote omitted).
155. 956 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
156. Id. at 766 (citing United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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conclusion in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union 639.157 In that case, the union had committed four
predicate acts during a four day strike. 158
Regardless of the
"relatively short duration of the strike," the court held that the acts
themselves "could, if proved, establish a distinct threat of long term
racketeering activity, either explicit or implicit."' 59 Likewise, it
could be argued that just as with the strikes in these two cases, an
after-acquired stores clause could create a threat of continuity, even
though the organizing drives at the initial facility or facilities have
ended. However, absent such a clause, open continuity may be
difficult to show because of the natural ending point.
2. Showing Closed Continuity
Most litigants advancing this theory will likely choose to show
closed continuity in order to meet the "pattern" requirement. Closed
continuity is "centrally a temporal concept."'' 60 Thus, there must be
16
sufficient duration between the first and last predicate act alleged.
Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months will generally
62
not be of sufficient duration to meet the pattern requirement.1
With this in mind, courts have generally been unwilling to find closed
continuity when acts occurred over a limited period, often requiring
something greater than one year.' 63 The Eleventh Circuit has held
that six months is not enough. 164 The Seventh Circuit has similarly
held that seven months is not enough. 65 Acts extended over longer
periods have, however, been found sufficient. The Third Circuit has
held that nineteen months could be sufficient. 66 The Fourth Circuit

157. 883 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
158. Id. at 134, 138.
159. Id. at 145.
160. H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1989).
161. Id. at 242.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., A. Terzi Prods. v. Theatrical Protective Union, 2 F. Supp. 2d 485, 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (two week period insufficient to show closed continuity); Local 875 I.B.T.
Pension Fund v. Pollack, 992 F. Supp. 545, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (two year period sufficient); Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 820 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (six month period
insufficient); Young v. W. Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, 763 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D. Del. 1991)
(activity over eleven to fourteen months insufficient).
164. Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc., 953 F.2d 587, 593 (11 th Cir. 1992).
165. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Truck Drivers Local 705, 704 F. Supp. 859, 863 (N.D. Ill.
1989),
aff'd, 904 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1994).
166. United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 209 (3d Cir. 1992).
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recognizes that a two year pattern is sufficient. 167 A similar
threshold seems to exist in the Sixth Circuit.' 68 There is, however,
no litmus test or bright-line rule for the requisite duration. Many
circuits examine the duration issue on a case by case basis, with an eye
toward other factors that may lengthen or shorten the requisite
duration, such as the number of predicate acts, the number of
participants, and the number of victims. 169

Consequently, litigants

bringing these claims will be at the mercy of the case law in their
particular circuit, and in those circuits that have a longer durational
requirement, the likely success of these litigants will be greatly
reduced merely by the inherent (and relatively) short-term nature of
an organizing campaign. In Freightliner, for example, there were
three separate and distinct organizing efforts at three different
facilities involving hundreds of employees that arguably lasted less
than two-years. 70 Nonetheless, courts enjoy wide discretion to
recognize a closed pattern. The statute requires only two predicate
acts,' 71 and the Yellow Bus Lines court found a pattern despite only
four days of alleged racketeering activity. 172
V.

IMPLICATIONS

As explained above, modern neutrality agreements that provide
unions with active organizing assistance likely violate section 302 of

the LMRA. Depending on the language in these agreements and the
length of the scheme, they likely also violate RICO. For unions, if
the plaintiffs are successful in Freightliner this means that they will
167. Hessek v. North Am. Mortgage Ins. Servs., 2003 WL 23961817, at *5 (E.D. Va. 2003)
("Time periods of less than two years have failed to provide the requisite period of time.").
168. Javitch v. Capwill, 284 F. Supp. 2d 848, 856 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (two and one half years
found sufficient).
169. Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]here are no
rigid rules regarding what amounts to 'a substantial period of time' ....");
ePlus Tech Inc. v.
Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 182 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no mechanical formula to assess whether
the pattern requirement has been satisfied."); see also 2 DEVELOPING, supra note 154, at 2524
("[T]here is no bright line rule.").
170. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 24; see also Adcock Complaint, supra note
69, at 1. As explained above, there is a dispute as to the duration of the scheme. The union and
the employer argued that it lasted fourteen or, at most, fifteen months, which was well short of the
"safe zone" of two years provided by the Fourth Circuit. However, based on the complaint, if the
court concludes the plaintiff could prove a set of facts the pattern continued beyond two years, the
motion to dismiss should fail on that basis.
171. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d
132, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 134, 139.
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obviously lose a powerful non-traditional recognition tool that has,
by many accounts, halted the decline in union membership. For
employers, like Heartland, seeking an amicable relationship or a labor
partner, they will have to deal with unions at arms length until, and
if, the union is ultimately certified by the Board following an election
or card check. Beyond the direct impact on employers and unions,
the truly interesting aspect of these revelations is the global
implications for American labor law. Is it really a bad thing to
impose liability for entering into certain types of neutrality
agreements?
Should courts be meddling with pre-certification
bargaining between unions and employers? What implications does
civil liability for neutrality agreements have on post-certification
collective bargaining?
Although unions will likely disagree, imposing liability for
entering into certain types of neutrality agreements is not a bad
thing. It can, indeed, be a good thing. The Freightliner story is proof
of this. In that case, if the allegations are accurate, the union made
significant bargaining concessions as a quid pro quo for a set of
admittedly organizational-friendly neutrality provisions.173
There
were twelve concessions total, all of which were made before the
union became the exclusive representative of the Freightliner
employees.' 74
Even more problematic, it is alleged that these
concessions were not revealed to Freightliner employees.1 75 A few of
the more notable concessions allegedly included: (a) no guaranteed
employment or transfer rights between Business Units or Plants; (b)
no sub-contracting prohibitions; (c) no additional restrictions
imposed against overtime scheduling; (d) future benefits cost increases
will be shared between the company and employees; and (e) there will
be no wage adjustments provided at any newly organized facility prior
to mid-2003.1 76
There was nothing regulating the union's
concessionary behavior.1 77 Indeed, the duty of fair representation
does not attach until the union is certified, nor were any employees
allegedly aware of the concessions until after-the-fact.1 78 Unions in
173. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, No. 3:06CV32, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *1-2
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2006).
174. Adcock Complaint, supra note 69, at 6, 9-10.
175. Adcock Complaint, supranote 69, at 2.
176. Preconditions Agreement, supra note 99,
2, 6, 8, 10, 12.
177. See generally Adcock Complaint, supra note 69, at 1-2 (alleging that the agreements
between Freightliner and the UAW were secret and that the bargaining concessions were
deliberately concealed from the employees).
178. Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Commc'ns Union, 628 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
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pre-certification bargaining are, therefore, free to pursue their own
institutional self-interest. As one author put it, the employees are
"the group that loses the most when neutrality agreements are
entered into" because the employees "are the least powerful of the
relevant groups and have no say in the decision to enter such
agreements."'79
The obvious response to this line of reasoning is the fear that
imposing liability on parties entering into neutrality agreements
would criminalize collective bargaining agreements.'
This is true,
the argument goes, because "collective bargaining virtually always
results in agreements that contain non-monetary provisions [that]
the union wants. '1 81
This argument suffers the fatal flaw of
mischaracterizing (or perhaps misunderstanding) the nature of the
benefit received by the union. In the organizing assistance context,
the employer is, arguably, under-valuing the nature of the benefit
associated with such assistance. Whereas here, the argument, offered
above, over-values the nature of the benefit received by the union in
the collective bargaining setting.
With collective bargaining, the "thing of value" should run
directly to the employees, not the union. However, the union may
certainly benefit indirectly when a favorable term of employment is
negotiated. Arguably, once the union is certified as the employees'
exclusive representative, it has received its tangible and financial
"thing of value." The real question is if contracted organizational
assistance resulting in dues revenue-a distinctly tangible financial
commodity-is a "thing of value."
At the negotiating stage, on the other hand, all the benefits
flowing to the union have, as the employer argued in Freightliner,
ephemeral and subjective value, benefits admittedly not covered by
section 302.182 Consequently, the American labor community need
not fear. Section 302 premised RICO claims would not spell the end
to collective bargaining as we know it. In fact, just the opposite may
be true. The sanctity of the collective bargaining process, which has
always been (or at least should always be) employee-centered, will be
preserved. If the Fourth Circuit accepts the plaintiffs' theory, then

(noting that an uncertified union was not a proper party to a duty of fair representation claim).
179. Kramer, Miller & Bierman, supra note 31, at 79.
180. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 11.
181. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
182. UAW Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 9-11; Freightliner Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 95, at 8-11.
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employers will have less incentive to secretly engage in precertification concessionary bargaining, which is neither regulated by
the NLRA or the LMRA (at this time) nor the employees the union
seeks to represent.
The authors lend these thoughts not as a means of convincing
their audience, but rather to facilitate discussion and debate on the
very real possibility that the Fourth Circuit will find active organizing
assistanceunlawful under section 302 and criminal under RICO.
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